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I.

STATE FARM HAS CITED NO UTAH LAW OR POLICY THAT
TAKES THIS CASE OUT OF THE DIRECT APPLICATION OF
THE MAJORITY RULE

Inexplicably, State Farm cites Allen v. Prudential Prp. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839
P.2d 798, 804-05 (Utah 1992) to show that this court uhas expressed an
unwillingness to make modifications to the terms of an insurance policy in the
absence of specific legislative direction," noting the active and preeminent role that
Utah's executive and legislative branches have taken in the insurance arena. (P. 7
of State Farm's Opening Brief)

But by invoking that case, State Farm seems to

argue at page 7 of its opening brief that the case implies that the judiciary has no
role to play whatsoever in determining whether an insurance provision is against
the public policy of the state of Utah. That is manifestly incorrect.
The Supreme Court has voided other clauses as against the public policy of the
state of Utah. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985)
"held that a household or family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance
policy contravenes the statutory requirements found in Utah's No-Fault Insurance
[1043] Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-41-1 to -13 (1974, Supp. 1985) (now sections
31A-22-306 to -309 (1986)), as to the minimum benefits which must be provided
to all persons sustaining personal injuries." This quote is from State Farm Mut.
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Auto Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1042-1043 (Utah 1987) which noted
that Utah adhered to the majority rule on the family exclusion issue.
State Farm's argument is self-contradictory. Because the legislature has
taken such a great interest in the regulation of the insurance industry, the judiciary
must be all the more vigilant in assuring that the public policy of the state so
forcefully set forth in an extensive legislative and regulatory scheme must not be
undermined by contractual provisions contrary to that public policy. This, in fact,
is found in the reasoning of the cases that hold with the majority rule in voiding
exhaustion clauses. They note, as basis for their ruling on public policy grounds,
the extensive insurance legislation, one prominent example being the extensive
UIM provisions at issue here. Mr. McArthur is not arguing for an application of
the reasonable expectations doctrine rejected in Allen v. Prudential, id., nor has he
ever. He simply argues that the exhaustion clause violates the public policy so
thoroughly established by Utah statutory and common law.
At pages 8 and 9 of its brief, relying upon the single reference to the
condition upon which a plaintiff may insist upon a five-day waiver of subrogation,
State Farm argues that "exhaustion clauses are specifically contemplated by Utah
statute." That is an overstatement. The statute cited makes no reference to the socalled exhaustion clause of the UIM contract. It merely refers to "policy limits" in
the typical situation when a plaintiff will wish to avoid the subrogation dilemma
4

described at pages 23 and 24 of the Mr. Mc Arthur's opening brief. It may be
construed to mean that if the injured party desires to invoke the strict five-day
waiver rule, he or she must obtain a policy limits offer. However, in such case,
nothing prevents the injured party from invoking State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Green, 89 P.3d 97, 104, 2003 UT 48 (Sup. Ct. 2003) to show that the failure to
allow the UIM carrier the right to pay off the liability coverage within five days of
the said notice created no actual prejudice to the UIM carrier.
State Farm argues at page 8 of its brief that UCA sec. 31A-22-305.3(l)(b),
in defining UIM coverage, the phrase "insufficient liability coverage" indicates a
legislative policy in favor of the exhaustion clause. Mr. McArthur showed the
weakness of that argument in his opening brief by reference to the UIM statutes of
the various Western jurisdictions that use the phrase "policy limits" in defining
UIM coverage and yet still hold the exhaustion clause invalid as against public
policy. See the section of Mc Arthur's opening brief beginning at page 28. There
Mr. Mc Arthur showed that Utah's legislature's choice of language is much more
conducive to invalidating the exhaustion clause than other Western states which
have already invalidated it.

1

In other words, if an injured party either forgets to give the five-day notice or does
not do so because he or she has not exhausted policy limits, Green dictates that the
UIM carrier must prove actual prejudice, must prove that it would have likely
collected a personal judgment against the tortfeasor if it had been allowed to pay
the liability payment. See discussion below at page 7, 11-12.
5

The slippery slope about which State Farm worries on page 10 of its opening
brief is really a red herring. Plaintiffs will always seek to maximize their liability
settlement, will always seek to exhaust policy limits because they have every
incentive to do so. They will not casually walk away from liability money because
of the credit that the UIM carrier is granted. The UIM plaintiff must prove
damages that exceed policy limits even if the policy limits have not been
exhausted. If the UIM plaintiff proves such damages, he or she ought to collect
those damages, even if, because of some technicality, he or she has not been able
to exhaust all the policy limits of all the potentially liable parties. The UIM carrier
suffers no economic detriment by paying out in UIM proceeds what the plaintiff
has actually suffered in damages.
At page 11 of its brief in the one full paragraph on that page, State Farm
expresses concern that, without a policy limits offer, the UIM carrier cannot be
forced to waive subrogation and that the liability carrier will therefore remain
unwilling to settle. State Farm fails to explain the relevance of this curious
argument. This argument is curious because it seems to allude to the dilemma that
Mr. McArthur expounded in his opening brief in support of invalidating the
exhaustion clause. It is true that the liability carrier will not settle without a
release. So, in order to obtain a settlement with the liability carrier, the injured
party must always give a release no matter whether policy limits are achieved or
6

not. If the injured party gives a release for less than policy limits, he or she,
depending on the construction of the statute, may not be able to insist upon waiver
of subrogation. However, then the injured party could invoke the doctrine of
Green, supra.
The Green doctrine, as explained more fully above on page five deals with
the fact situation where a UIM carrier attempts to deny UIM benefits to an injured
party who has released the tortfeasor and thus precluded the UIM carrier from any
possibility of subrogation. The Green doctrine holds that UIM benefits cannot be
denied the injured party in this situation unless the UIM carrier can prove actual
prejudice, can prove that, but for the release, it could have actually collected a
personal subrogation judgment against the tortfeasor.
If the court allows the injured party to invoke the five-day waiver rule even
while accepting a settlement less than policy limits, then the mechanics of that
situation are easy and no different. The injured party would simply notify the UIM
carrier that it intends to make a UIM claim even though it proposes to settle the
liability case for less than policy limits. Then the UIM carrier could decide
whether to pay the lesser amount of liability limits to preserve its right of
subrogation. For example, in the instant case State Farm could have elected to pay
Mr. McArthur the $90,000 that he was willing to accept from the liability carrier.
Then State Farm could have sued the tortfeasor, who would still have been entitled
7

to a defense from his liability carrier. Should State Farm succeed in such suit, it
would obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor for the $190,000 it paid out to Mr.
McArthur. The liability carrier would presumably pay out its policy limits and
then State Farm would have to collect the balance from the personal assets of the
tortfeasor. However, subrogation suits are highly unlikely as shown in the opening
brief.
The majority rule shows clearly that the underinsurance carrier will suffer no
economic detriment by the vitiation of the exhaustion clause because of the credit
for the policy limits that the majority rule affords the carrier. The majority rule
sometimes calls this "constructive exhaustion." Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Adkins,
215 W. Va. 297, 306 (W. Va. 2004). That this principle of constructive exhaustion
assures State Farm that it will gain the full benefit of the policy limits credit was
not disputed by State Farm in its brief.
The only economic interest that State Farm claims in the exhaustion clause
is that its elimination would create more underinsured motorist exposure. State
Farm in essence argues that it will lose the benefit of excluding meritorious claims
that are technically invalid under the exhaustion clause. That argument cannot
prevail because, if it were a valid argument, then no oppressive or illegal insurance
exclusion could be vitiated as against public policy because each such invalid
exclusion has an economic benefit to the insurer by reducing coverage.
8

State Farm has argued that the UIM carrier should not be expected to incur
any expense to evaluate the accident claim since that is the primary duty of the
liability carrier. This argument fails as a matter of Utah law. Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) in an uninsured motorist case described the
duties of the insurance carrier in every first party insurance contract (such as UM
and UIM situations.)
. . . we conclude that the implied obligation of good faith performance
contemplates, at the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the
facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate
the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or
settling the claim.
These, of course, are the duties that State Farm suggests it cannot be expected to
perform as a UIM carrier. In every UIM case, State Farm must perform the same
investigation that the liability carrier has performed. Each UIM carrier examines
liability and demands all copies of medical records and negotiates in the same
manner as though it were adjusting a liability claim. There is nothing in the UIM
contract that requires the carrier to accept the tortfeasor's fault even if the liability
carrier has done so. Because of Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 701 P.2d 795,800801 (Utah 1985), in Utah the UIM carrier cannot be sued in tortious bad faith as
can the liability carrier. Therefore, the UIM carrier can assume a bolder defense
9

than can the liability carrier who needs to concern itself with settling within policy
limits to avoid a tortious bad faith claim and punitive damages.

II.

GREEN HAS BROAD APPLICATION CONSISTENT WITH THE
MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS
The second certified question seems to refer directly to State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 104, 2003 UT 48 (Sup. Ct. 2003). The Tenth
Circuit seems to be asking whether this Honorable Court would treat the
exhaustion clause the way it treated the consent-to-settle clause in Green. In other
words, since Green did not hold the consent-to-settle clause void as against public
policy, but rather avoided the harsh effects of the clause by requiring the UIM
insurer to prove actual prejudice to its right of subrogation, would this court follow
Green by deeming the exhaustion clause not void per se, but subject to avoidance
where the UIM insurer cannot prove such prejudice?
State Farm argues that Green is inapposite to the instant case because Green
involved a "consent-to-settle clause", noting that Green's clause was a covenant
while the exhaustion clause is a condition. State Farm fails to explain how that
distinction matters. Both provisions are properly termed "exclusions" from
coverage.
But the distinction may be invalid in any event. The consent-to-settle clause
acts like a condition. The purpose of the consent-to-settle clause as acknowledged
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in Green is to protect the UIM insurer's subrogation claim by reserving the right to
refuse settlement if the liability carrier insists on a release of all claims. The UIM
carrier conditions any payment of UIM proceeds on its insured's first obtaining its
consent to settle. This is certainly tantamount to a condition.
In both cases, whether the insurer calls it a condition, covenant, or exclusion,
the insurer is attempting to exploit a technicality pertaining to the underlying
liability coverage in order to deny UIM coverage. Both the consent-to-settle clause
and the exhaustion clause have a common objective: to deny UIM coverage by
imposition of a technical condition having no economic consequence to the
insurer, a condition relating primarily to the settlement of an underlying tort claim.
Both Green and the instant case have much to do with subrogation. Green
observed at 101 that: "Consent to settle exclusions like the one in Green's policies
are intended to protect an insurer's subrogation rights against a tortfeasor." In the
instant case, the only reference to "policy limits" occurs in Utah Code Ann. Sec.
31A-22-305.3(5)(a) which deals only with subrogation. Green's application is
greater than the consent-to-settle clause.
If, for example, an injured plaintiff settles with a tortfeasor, expecting to
satisfy the rest of the claim from UIM coverage, but forgets to give the UIM
insurer the required five-day notice, then such plaintiff simply invokes the
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principles of Green that the UIM carrier cannot by such forgetfulness avoid the
claim unless it can show actual prejudice to its subrogation rights.
If the intent of both provisions is to avoid the payment of UIM benefits on
technicalities imposed on underlying tort claims, this Honorable Court should not
tolerate the exhaustion clause while having effectively nullified the consent-tosettle clause. Both invoke technicalities that the great majority of jurisdictions
have rejected on the ground that UIM coverage is beneficial and desirable under
the public policy of the state.
Both Green and the instant case involve questions about whether the
settlement of an underlying tort case has done prejudice to the UIM insurer. The
essential principle of the Green case stated at p. 104, paragraph 32 applies equally
forcefully in both cases:
The actual prejudice requirement that we adopt is consistent with the
legislative scheme. Utah law prevents an insurance company from relying on
certain technical policy breaches as a basis for denying coverage. Generally,
if [21] an insured in Utah fails to provide notice or proof of loss to its
insurer as required by the terms of an insurance policy, the insurer may not
deny recovery to the insured unless the insurer was prejudiced by the failure.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-312(2) (2001). There is no reason why the rule
should be harsher to the insured in the context of a settlement that could
12

affect an insurer's subrogation rights. The actual prejudice rule strikes an
appropriate balance between protecting an insurer's interests and avoiding
forfeiture of coverage when an insurer has not been harmed.
This language shows that the principle of Green is not limited strictly to the
context of subrogation but applies to insurance policies in general. The principles
of materiality, noneconomic harm and actual prejudice apply with equal force in
the exhaustion clause case. Because of the credit given the UIM insurer for the
entire amount of the policy limits, State Farm can show no economic prejudice by
Mr. McArthur's settlement of his tort claim.
Green adopted the rule followed by many jurisdictions that "an insurer must
show that it was prejudiced by the settlement of the tort claim." P. 104, Para. 30.
The instant case involves State Farm's objection to an underlying tort settlement,
but State Farm cannot show that Mr. McArthur's settlement of his tort claim
prejudiced it in anyway. Again the cases correspond directly.
State Farm argues that whether a UIM carrier has lost subrogation rights is
irrelevant because the exhaustion clause is a fundamental precondition, implying
that the economic impact of the exhaustion is irrelevant. If the exhaustion clause
has no economic impact, then no actual prejudice can be shown. Thus, State Farm
is seen to be insisting on economically inconsequential technicality.
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Constructive exhaustion also addresses the issue that State Farm raises
concerning the need to determine whether its insured is actually underinsured and
thus entitled to UIM coverage. First, this does not appear to be a concern that is
discussed in any of the majority rule cases. Under the majority rule the UIM
carrier is only obligated to pay an amount in excess of the actual policy limits, if
the UIM insured can prove that his damages exceed the liability insurance limits.
Whether the injured person has actually received those limits has no bearing on his
proof of total damages.

III. CONCLUSION
If constructive exhaustion assures that State Farm suffers no economic harm
and if the exhaustion clause has the effect of granting State Farm a technical
excuse to deny valid UIM coverage, then the principles laid down by State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 104, 2003 UT 48 (Sup. Ct. 2003) show
that Utah should follow the majority rule. Since Utah followed the majority rule
on the consent-to-settle clause, Utah should take the next logical step, as did
Montana, and follow the majority rule on the exhaustion clause.
Dated this 30th day of March, 2011.
DIXON, TRUMAN, FISHER & CLIFFORD, P.C.
I si A. Bryce Dixon
A. BRYCE DIXON
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